SURVEY OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

IN NEW JERSEY LAW
In this section, the Seton Hall Law Review presents synopses of
recent New Jersey cases of interest to practitioners. In so doing, we hope
to assist the legal community in keeping abreast of some of the more
interesting changes in significant areas of practice.
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CRIMINAL

LAW- PREVENTION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ACTDEFENDANT WHO POSES THREAT TO PUBLIC HEALTH, SAFETY, OR
WELFARE IS NOT ENTITLED TO A RETURN OF FIREARMS EVEN IF
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE COMPLAINT AGAINST THAT DEFENDANT HAS

BEEN DISMISSED-In the Matter of Return of Weapons to J.W.D.,
149 N.J. 108, 693 A.2d 92 (1997).
Defendant, J.W.D., had two domestic violence complaints filed
against him. 149 N.J. at 110-11, 693 A.2d at 93. He is now divorced
from his wife, S.D., who filed both of the complaints pursuant to N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:25-17 to -33 (West 1997) (the "Domestic Violence
Act"). See id. at 110, 693 A.2d at 93. When the first complaint was
filed by S.D. on June 2, 1992, the police confiscated the defendant's
guns and firearms purchaser's identification card. See id. at 111, 693
A.2d at 93. S.D. ultimately agreed to dismiss the complaint after the
couple agreed to separate and attend marriage counseling. Upon dismissal, defendant requested the return of both his firearms and his purchaser identification card fiom the police department.
Defendant
claimed, in a letter to the police, that the guns were merely used for
sporting purposes and that failure to return the weapons would not prevent him from doing harm should he so desire. After receiving this letter, the police department returned both the firearms and the identification card to defendant.
When the couples' differences could not be resolved, S.D. filed for
a divorce on August 27, 1992. While this action was pending, she
brought a second domestic violence complaint against her husband in response to a confrontation which occurred on December 26, 1994. After
the complaint was filed, S.D. received a temporary restraining order
against the defendant. Pursuant to this order, the police once again confiscated the defendants guns and firearms purchaser identification card.
The second domestic violence complaint stemmed from incidents
which occurred on December 26, 1994. S.D. claimed that, on the date in
question, she went to pick up her son at defendant's home and demanded
that defendant return her son's new coat. When defendant attempted to
close the door, a conflict ensued and defendant allegedly tried to push
S.D. off of the porch. At a subsequent hearing before the New Jersey
Superior Court, Chancery Division, Family Part, S.D. presented evidence of the assault, including photographs of bruises she sustained as a
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result of the alleged attack by her husband. See id. at 112, 693 A.2d at
93-94. Following the hearing, the chancery division dismissed the domestic violence complaint against the defendant and consequently removed the temporary restraining order. See id. at 112, 693 A.2d at 94.
After the complaint was dismissed, the defendant once again sent a letter
to the police requesting the return of his guns and identification card.
This time, however, the county prosecutor's office objected to the return
of the weapons and the card based on an investigation it conducted after
the second domestic violence complaint.
A hearing was held in the chancery division on May 25, 1995 to
determine whether defendant's weapons should be returned. At the
hearing, S.D. described the incident which had stemmed the second domestic violence complaint. S.D. further testified about other troubling
conduct engaged in by the defendant. Namely, on September 15, 1992,
S.D. claimed that she went to the marital home to pick up some of her
personal belongings, at which time she observed notes posted on the
windows which stated "danger, enter at your own risk." S.D. said that
she then peered into the windows and allegedly saw a device resembling
a spring gun which had been rigged by defendant. See id. She then later
returned to the home to find the post-it notes removed and observed that
the alleged "spring gun" was nothing more than a "drill under a towel"
and "a broom attached to a string." See id. In addition to this incident,
S.D. claimed that during their marriage defendant would sometimes play
country-western music, wear his guns and holster, and randomly draw
his gun in the house. See id. at 113, 693 A.2d at 94.
There were some factual disputes surrounding S.D.'s allegations.
Defendant claimed that he had been scratched by S.D. during the December 16, 1994 incident. See id. at 112, 693 A.2d at 94. Based on these
allegations, he filed a cross-complaint against S.D. in the second domestic violence action, which was also ultimately dismissed. See id. at 11112, 693 A.2d at 93-94. Further, defendant claimed that S.D.'s account
of the spring gun was a complete fabrication and that the presence of any
drill or broomstick was a mere coincidence. See id. at 113, 693 A.2d
94.
To supplement the testimony of both S.D. and the defendant, the
court ordered a custody evaluation report which revealed that defendant
was unstable, unpredictable, and possibly prone to violent outbursts.
After hearing all the relevant evidence, the chancery division concluded that the defendant posed a threat to public health, safety, and welfare. See 290 N.J. Super. 451, 676 A.2d 138 (Ch. Div. 1996). Adopting S.D.'s version of the events, the trial court found that the situation
was volatile and that allowing defendant to retain his weapons would
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pose a danger to his wife as well as the general public. See 149 N.J. at
113, 693 A.2d at 94. Based on these findings, the chancery division held
that the defendant's firearms should be forfeited pursuant to N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2C:25-21d(3) (West 1997). See id. Additionally, the trial court
found that defendant's identification card should be confiscated under
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:58-3c (West 1997) (the statute pertaining to the
licensing of firearms). See id.
The New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division agreed with the
trial court's conclusion that under N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C: 25-21d(3) the
court had the authority to retain and dispose of confiscated weapons if the
defendant posed a threat to public safety. See 290 N.J. Super 451, 676
A.2d 138 (App. Div. 1996). The appellate division further concluded
that this provision authorized $eizure of the weapons regardless of
whether the domestic violence complaint was ultimately dismissed. See
149 N.J. at 113, 693 A.2d at 94. However, the appellate division held
contrary to the chancery division with respect to the specific facts of the
case, finding that defendant did not pose a danger either to his ex-wife or
the general public welfare. See id. at 113, 693 A.2d at 94-95.
In determining that the defendant did not pose a danger the appellate
division noted that he held a secure job as a chemical engineer, served in
the military, and did not possess a criminal record. See 290 N.J. Super
at 461, 676 A.2d at 138. The appellate court emphasized that the defendant did not possess any know drug addictions, mental disorders or
physical ailments which might result in unsafe handling of the guns. See
id. Additionally, the appellate court's decision considered significant the
fact that the local police were not adverse to returning the weapons and
that the defendant had possessed his weapons since the dismissal of the
first complaint and had not engaged in any violent activity. See id.
Lastly, the appellate court questioned the significance of both the psychological evaluation and the letters sent by defendant to the prosecutor's
office, concluding that neither, suggested that the defendant was capable
of violence or constituted a danger to the public. See id. Based on these
observations, the appellate division ordered the defendant's guns and
identification card to be returned. See id. at 113, 693 A.2d at 95.
The New Jersey Supreme Court granted the state's petition for certification and affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the appellate division and further remanded the matter to the chancery division.
See 146 N.J. 496, 683 A.2d 199-(1996). See 149 N.J. at 110, 693 A.2d
at 93. The court held that the Domestic Violence Act authorizes the trial
court to retain and dispose of defendant's firearms if the defendant poses
a threat to the public health, safety and welfare, even if the domestic
violence complaint was ultimately dismissed. See 149 N.J. at 110, 693
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A.2d at 93. However, the supreme court remanded the case to the chancery division for a factual determination of whether the defendant posed
such a danger in the case at bar or whether the weapons should be returned. See id.
Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Pollock began by discussing
the Legislative intent of the Domestic Violence. Act. See 149 N.J. at
114, 693 A.2d at 95. The New Jersey Supreme Court found that the
purpose of the Act was to protect victims of actual and potential domestic violence. See id. (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-18 (West 1997)).
Justice Pollock made reference to specific statutory provisions which emphasized legislative intent to protect victims and enforce the law. See id.
(citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-18). The court then held that, consistent with the legislative purpose behind the act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2C:25-21(d)(1)(b) gave law enforcement officers the power to confiscate
weapons upon reasonable belief that failure to do so would expose the
victim or society to danger. See id.
Despite this interpretation of the legislative intent behind the act,
Justice Pollock recognized that the plain language of N.J. STAT. ANN.
2C:25-21(d) did not expressly authorize the prosecutor to retain and dispose of a defendant's weapons upon dismissal of the domestic violence
complaint. See id. The court reiterated a portion of the statute which
stated that a prosecutor may petition the judge to retain a defendant's
weapons or revoke a firearm's license on three grounds. See id. First,
Justice Pollock explained that any permits or licenses may be retained by
the state for the same reasons that such items may be originally withheld
or later rejected under the applicable licensing provision. See 149 N.J.
114-115, 693 A.2d at 95. Second, the court noted that the statute permits weapons and licenses to be withheld upon a determination that the
owner is unfit. See 149 N.J. 115, 693 A.2d at 95. Lastly, the court recognized that such items may be confiscated when the owner poses a danger to the general public or a specific individual. See id.
However the supreme court recognized that despite this statutory
language, the Domestic Violence Act when further to expressly required
the return of weapons in the following situations: when the complaint has
been dismissed at the complainants request; when there is insufficient
cause to indict; or if the defendant is found not guilty. See 149 N.J. 115,
693 A.2d at 95 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-21(d)(3)). Despite this
explicit statutory language, the court agreed with the lower courts' interpretation of the Domestic Violence Act and held that weapons could be
retained if a defendant poses a threat to the general public or a specific
individual. See id. Justice Pollock reasoned that when "a statute's plain
language would lead to a result contrary to the intent of the Legislature,
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courts are not confined to a literal reading of that language." See id.
(citing State v. State Troopers FraternalAss'n, 134 N.J. 393, 401, 634
A.2d 478 (1993)). Accordingly, although a strict interpretation of the
statute might lead to the conclusion that the defendant's weapons must be
returned, Justice Pollock found that such a result was not required because it conflicted with the clear legislative intent behind the statute. See
149 N.J. at 115, 693 A.2d at 96.
To further support his position that weapons do not have to be returned despite express statutory language to the contrary, Justice Pollock
referred to the provision relating the issuance of firearms purchaser identification cards. See id. Namely, the court cited N.J. Stat. Ann, §
2C:58-3, which provides that firearms purchaser identification cards
should only be issued to those individuals who do not pose a threat to the
public safety, health or welfare. See id. The court held that the Domestic Violence Act implicitly referred to N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C: 58-3 and
that the two statutes must therefore be construed in a consistent manner.
See 149 N.J. at 115-16, 693 A.2d at 96 (citing State v. Green, 62 N.J.
547, 554-55, 303 A.2d 312 (1973)). See also Kimmelman v. Henkels &
McCoy, Inc., 108 N.J. 123, 129 527 A.2d 1368 (1987) and New Jersey
Builders, Owners, & Managers Ass'n v. Blair, 60 N.J. 330, 338 (1972)
(holding that consideration must be given to the entire legislative scheme
when determining the legislative intent behind a particular statute).
Based on this analysis, Justice Pollock concluded that reading the licensing statute in conjunction with the Domestic Violence Act revealed a
clear legislative intent permitting courts to retain a defendant's weapons
when he poses a threat to the public health, safety or welfare. See 149
N.J. at 116, 693 A.2d at 96. The justice opined that the entire legislative
scheme suggested a goal of preventing weapons from being returned to a
defendant who poses a danger to others. See id. Accordingly, the court
reached the conclusion that weapons seized pursuant to a complaint
brought under the Domestic Violence Act could be withheld when the
judge made a determination that such retention was necessary to protect
public safety. See id.
The court then proffered several suggestions as to what should be
done with a defendant's weapons once the court makes a determination
that they should not be returned. See id. Justice Pollock found that the
weapons could be sold and the money from the sale could be paid to the
defendant. See id. (citing State v. Cunningham, 186 N.J. Super 502,
513, 453 A.2d 239 (App. Div. 1982). In the alternative, the court suggested that the weapons could be transferred to a qualified individual of
the defendant's choice, providing that such individual possesses the appropriate licensure and authorization. See id.
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The next issue facing the supreme court was the disagreement between the lower courts as to whether or not the defendant in the case at
bar posed a threat to the public, thus warranting retention of his weapons. See 149 N.J. at 116, 693 A.2d at 96. Namely, the trial court found
that the defendant did pose such a threat, while the appellate division
concluded that he did not. See id. Justice Pollock first expressed the
general rule that appellate courts are ordinarily required to accept all
factual findings of the trial court, providing that such determinations
were based on credible evidence and would not constitute an injustice.
See 149 N.J. at 116-17, 693 A.2d at 96. (citing Bonnco Petrol, Inc. v.
Epstein, 115 N.J. 599, 607, 560 A.2d 655 (1989) and Rova Farms Resort
v. Investors Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 483-84, 323 A.2d 495 (1974)). The
court further stated that such deference was especially warranted when
factual findings are largely based on testimony, thus necessitating a conclusion regarding the witnesses' credibility. See id. Justice Pollock
noted that the same level of deference was not required when an appellate
court reviewed the legal conclusions of the trial court. See 149 N.J. at
117, 693 A.2d at 96 (citing ManalapanRealty v. Township Comm., 140
N.J. 366, 378, 658 A.2d 1230 (1995).
The supreme court then recognized then reiterated the essential
findings of fact made by the trial court and the appellate division. See id.
Significantly, the court realized that the trial judge had personally observed testimony relating to the matter, adopted the wife's version of the
events, and had concluded that the situation was extremely bitter and
volatile. See id. The supreme court also made reference to the appellate
division's contrasting findings, which focused on different facts in determining that the defendant did not pose a threat. See id.
Since the lower courts' factual findings were focused on different
facts, the supreme court held that the best approach to resolve the conflict
was to remand the case to the Family Part for reconsideration. See 149
N.J. at 118, 693 A.2d at 97. Specifically, Justice Pollock ordered the
trial court to reconsider whether the defendant constituted a danger to the
public health, safety or welfare, thereby warranting retention of his
weapons and firearms purchaser identification card. See id. In so ruling,
the supreme court was careful to recognize that the trial court's original
findings were based on testimonial evidence and stated that its opinion
did bot suggest that the trial court needed to change its original findings.
See id.
This opinion is significant in that it suggests that the supreme court
will not hesitate to take any action necessary to protect the public health
and safety. Clearly, the court's decision recognizes the profound domestic violence problems which plague society and reflects a strong stance by
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the court to combat this problem. The court's uniform commitment to
this problem is emphasized by the fact that there is neither a concurring
or a dissenting opinion. The supreme court's conviction is further demonstrated by the fact that it ignores -the plain language of a statute to
reach a practical conclusion which it believes is in the best interests of
the general public.
.In taking such a noble position, however, the supreme court virtually ignores the fact that an essentially innocent individual might be
forced to suffer unwarranted punishment because of this decision.
Namely, even if .the domestic violence is dismissed, voluntarily or because there is insufficient evidence to indict, or, even if the defendant is
found not guilty, an innocent defendant may still be relieved of his personal possessions. See 140 N.J. at 115, 693 A.2d 95. Such an outcome,
although it may further societal interests in protection and safety, seems
contrary to the constitutional protection that "all individuals are innocent
until proven guilty." Under this decision, a defendant may be found innocent and yet be treated as if he was found guilty, the punishment coming in the form of the retraction of a privilege previously granted by the
state (the firearms purchaser identification card) as well as the loss of
personal property.
While the supreme court should be applauded for its efforts to protect the public safety and combat domestic violence, it cannot lose sight
of the fact that its decision holds the potential for abuse. While protecting the public against violence, it compromises society's interest in insuring that innocent individuals will not exposed to a second judicial action stemming from a single incident for which the defendant has already
been found not liable. Thus, perhaps the plain language used in the Domestic Violence Act was placed there for a specific purpose, in order to
insure that in the midst of the fight against domestic abuse the defendant's rights would not be lost. The supreme court's decision accordingly sacrifices one important public interest in favor of another.
Stacey Eisenberg
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EVIDENCE- CRIMINAL LAW- OTHER-CRIME EVIDENCE- IMPROPER
ADMISSION OF OTHER-CRIME EVIDENCE, WHEN INDEPENDENT,
OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S GUILT EXISTS,

CONSTITUTES HARMLESS ERROR-State v. Marrero, 148 N.J. 469,

691 A.2d 293 (1997).
On Friday, August 26, 1988, defendant Adam Marrero (Marrero)
met and gave a ride to F.C., the alleged victim. See State v. Marrero,
148 N.J. 469, 474, 691 A.2d 293, 295 (1997). The next morning,
F.C.'s daughter notified Vineland police that her mother had not returned
home. A search for F.C. was conducted, and three days later, F.C.'s
body was found naked with her arms extended over her head, legs spread
apart and knees bent. F.C.'s neck was bruised and her hyoid bone was
fractured. See id. at 476, 691 A.2d at 296. A piece of wood was lodged
in F.C.'s throat and semen matching defendant's semen-type was found
on the victim's sweater. An autopsy rep6 rt concluded that F.C. died by
manual strangulation some time between twenty-four hours and several
days prior to the body's discovery.
Police questioned defendant, and after inconsistencies in Marrero's
story surfaced, police brought Marrero to police headquarters. See id. at
475-76, 691 A.2d at 296. There, police noticed bruises and swelling on
defendant's hands. See id. at 476, 691 A.2d at 296. Tire tracks found
near F.C.'s body upon discovery matched the tires on the truck driven by
Marrero the night F.C. disappeared. Pieces of vegetation lodged in the
truck's undercarriage matched the undergrowth surrounding the victim's
body. The wood lodged in F.C.'s throat matched the wood in the truck's
bed. Based on this evidence, Marrero was arrested and indicted for kidnapping, aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault, murder, and felony
murder. See id. at 474-75, 691 A.2d at 295.
During Marrero's trial, the State sought to introduce evidence concerning two prior sexual assaults committed by defendant. See id. at
477, 691 A.2d at 297. Essentially, the State sought to admit three pieces
of other-crime evidence: (1) that Marrero had pled guilty to a prior sexual assault; (2) that just one day prior to F.C.'s death, Marrero was released from jail after serving a sentence for sexual assault; and (3) that
Marrero was awaiting sentencing for a prior sexual assault when F.C.
was killed. See id. at 476, 492, 691 A.2d at 297, 304.
The trial court denied the motion by the State to introduce the othercrime evidence. See id. at 477, 691 A.2d at 297. The New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, with one judge dissenting, reversed and
ordered the trial court to allow the State to introduce the fact that Marrero's sentencing for a prior sexual assault was pending at the time of
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F.C.'s death. See id. The appellate division also ordered the trial court
to instruct the jury that its consideration of the other-crime evidence was
limited. See id. The dissenting judge argued that under the balancing
test of New Jersey's Evidence Rule 4, the trial court's exclusion of the
other-crime evidence should be upheld. See id. at 478, 691 A.2d at 297.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey denied defendant's interlocutory motion for leave to appeal. See id. At the conclusion of the case, the trial
court dismissed the second-degree sexual assault charge. See id. The
jury convicted Marrero of murder, felony murder, kidnapping, and aggravated sexual assault. See id. at 478-79, 691 A.2d at 297. Marrero
was sentenced to life imprisonment plus twenty years, with forty years of
ineligibility for parole. See id. at 479, 691 A.2d at 297.
In an unpublished opinion, the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, with one judge dissenting, affirmed the conviction. See id.
The majority of the panel reasoned that the "law of the case doctrine"
governed the appeal. See id. The appellate court posited that because it
instructed the trial court to admit the other-crime evidence, it could not
then overturn convictions based on the inadmissibility of that same evidence. See id. The dissenting judge countered that the "law of the case
doctrine" was discretionary and that under the Evidence Rule 4 probative-value-versus-undue-prejudice balancing test, the trial court properly
excluded the other-crime evidence. See id., 691 A.2d at 297-98. Therefore, the dissent argued, Marrero's conviction should be overturned. See
id., 691 A.2d at 297.
After the direct appeal to the appellate division concluded, Marrero
sought an appeal as of right to the Supreme Court of New Jersey, based
upon the two dissents at the appellate level. See id. at 479-80, 691 A.2d
at 298. Because the issue framed by the dissents in both appellate court
rulings addressed the prejudicial effect of admitting the other-crime evidence, the supreme court's review was limited to the sole issue of the
prejudicial effect of admitting the other-crime evidence. See id. at 48081, 691 A.2d at 298-99. The supreme court conducted a two-part inquiry of the Marrero case. See id. at 481, 691 A.2d at 299. First, the
court addressed whether the appellate court erred by overturning the trial
court's determination of the inadmissibility of the other-crime evidence.
See id. Because the court answered the first question in the affirmative,
see id. at 484, 691 A.2d at 300, the court then analyzed whether the error was harmless, in that it did not lead to an unjust result. See id. at
481, 484-93, 691 A.2d at 299, 300-04.
Writing for the majority, Justice Coleman held that despite an insufficient limiting instruction, when evidence independent of potentially improperly-admitted other-crime evidence conclusively and overwhelmingly
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establishes the defendant's guilt, the jury is not directed towards a result
it might otherwise not have reached; therefore, the appellate court's error
in substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court was harmless.
See id. at 497, 691 A.2d at 307. To reach this conclusion, Justice Coleman first noted that at the time of Marrero's trial for F.C.'s kidnapping,
rape, and murder, the question of the admissibility of other-crime evidence was governed by New Jersey Evidence Rule 55. See id. at 481,
691 A.2d at 299. Evidence Rule 55, the justice explained, has since been
replaced by New Jersey Rule of Evidence 404(b); additionally, the balancing test of Evidence Rule 4 is now found in New Jersey Rule of Evidence 403. See id. at 482, 691 A.2d at 299. Justice Coleman then stated
that, viewed in conjunction. Evidence Rules 4 and 55 created a rule of
exclusion, not inclusion. See id. at 482-83, 691 A.2d at 299 (citing State
v. Cofield, 127 N.J. 328, 337-38, 605 A.2d 230, 234-35 (1992)).
Justice Coleman asserted that because the appellate court did not
discuss the deferential standard of review governing the appeal, but simply substituted its own judgment in determining whether the other-crime
evidence was admissible, the appellate court erred. See id. at 484, 691
A.2d at 300. The majority then addressed whether this error was harmless. See id. The court began its harmless-error analysis by setting forth
the four-prong test from State v. Cofield. See id. at 483, 691 A.2d at
299. To determine whether the other-crime evidence was admissible, the
majority stated, the evidence must first be relevant to a material issue;
second, the other-crime evidence "must be similar in kind and reasonably
close in time to the offense charged"; third, it "must be clear and convincing"; and lastly, the prejudicial effect of admitting the other-crime
evidence must not outweigh the evidence's probative worth. Id. (quoting
Cofield, 127 N.J. at 338). The majority surmised that at all levels, the
pertinent inquiry correctly focused on the first and fourth prongs of the
Cofield test: relevance and a balancing of probative value versus prejudicial effect. See id. at 484, 691 A.2d at 300.
Justice Coleman opined that the disputed evidence satisfied the test's
first prong, because the other-crime evidence was relevant to the issues of
state of mind and motive. See id. at 484-85, 691 A.2d at 300-01. The
majority explained that state of mind was a material issue because Marrero claimed he engaged in consensual sexual intercourse with the alleged
victim. See id. at 485, 691 A.2d at 301. The court concluded the othercrime evidence was relevant and material to Marrero's motive and intent
to kill because the issue of whether Marrero killed F.C. to silence her
and prevent his being sent back to jail was truly in dispute. See id. at
485-86, 691 A.2d at 301. Justice Coleman then traced past New Jersey
Supreme Court and New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, decisions where other-crime evidence was probative of both intent and mo-
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tive. See id. at 486-87, 691 A.2d at 301-02. The majority buttressed its
conclusion that the other-crime evidence was relevant and material by
citing North Carolina and Pennsylvania court cases where other-crime
evidence was admitted in situations virtually identical to the Marrero
case. See id. at 487-89, 691 A.2d at 302-03.
The court then addressed whether the fourth prong of the Cofield
test, the "probative-prejudicial balancing test," was also satisfied. Id. at
490, 691 A.2d at 303. Justice Coleman posited that the probative value
of the other-crime evidence must be evaluated "in the context in which
that evidence was offered." Id. at 491, 691 A.2d at 304 (citing State v.
Stevens, 115 N.J. 289, 303, 558 A.2d 833, 841 (1989)). Although recognizing the existence of a high threshold for admissibility of other-crime
evidence, the majority nonetheless asserted that once a decision to admit
other-crime evidence is made, that decision should stand "unless 'the
danger of undue prejudice . . . outweigh[s] probative value so as to divert
jurors from a reasonable and fair evaluation of the basic issue of guilt or
innocence.'" Id. at 490, 691 A.2d at 303 (quoting State v. Moore, 122
N.J. 420, 467, 585 A.2d 864, 888 (1991)).
Justice Coleman next turned to the contextual factors pertinent to the
probative worth and prejudicial effect of the other-crime evidence. See
id. at 491-92, 691 A.2d at 303-04. The majority ultimately concluded
that the other-crime evidence passed muster under the probativeprejudicial balancing test. See id. at 492, 691 A.2d at 304. The majority
rested its decision on two assertions: (1) that the "other-crime evidence
was 'inextricably entwined with the material facts'" of the case because
the other-crime evidence involved acts committed reasonably close in
time to the alleged attack on F.C., id. at 491, 691 A.2d at 304 (quoting
State v. West, 29 NJ. 327, 335, 149 A.2d 217, 221 (1959)); and (2) that
the prosecution did not use the other-crime evidence to show Marrero's
propensity for committing sexual assaults. See id. at 492, 691 A.2d at
304. Justice Coleman further supported the court's determination by
noting that the trial jury was instructed to consider the other-crime evidence only after independently concluding that Marrero committed the
homicide from other evidence proffered. See id.
The court then examined whether the appellate court's usurpation of
the trial court's discretionary prerogative to exclude other-crime evidence
was harmless error. See id. The majority first noted that the appellate
court determined that the trial court had abused its discretion by excluding the other-crime evidence. See id. Justice Coleman articulated that an
error can be classified as harmless provided that any prejudice to the defendant did not result in the real possibility that the jury reached a decision it otherwise might not have made if the erroneously admitted other-
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crime evidence was not available. See id. at 492-93, 691 A.2d at 304.
In conclusory language, the majority asserted that contrary to the dissent's view, a reasonable and fair evaluation of Marrero's guilt or innocence was not unduly tainted by the improper admission of the othercrime evidence. See id. at 493, 691 A.2d at 304.
Lastly, Justice Coleman discussed the sufficiency of the trial court's
limiting instruction concerning the other-crime evidence. See id. at 49397, 691 A.2d at 304-07. The majority explained that because the adequacy of the jury instruction completed the overall analysis of whether
the appellate court's error was indeed harmless, the instruction had to be
examined even though not raised on appeal. See id. at 494, 691 A.2d at
305. Justice Coleman transcribed the jury instruction, which, in essence,
instructed the jury to consider the other crime evidence only after concluding that Marerro was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and then
only in the context of degree and type of homicide committed. See id. at
493-94, 691 A.2d at 304-05. The justice noted, however, that the instruction did not expressly forbid the jury from using the other-crime
evidence for deciding Marrero's propensity for being a rapist. See id. at
495-96, 691 A.2d at 306. The majority commented that the limiting jury
instruction was neither completely sufficient nor deficient. See id. at
495, 691 A.2d at 306. The true problem, the majority posited, was that
although the instruction was not an affirmative misstatement of the law, it
was nevertheless an incomplete instruction . See id. at 496, 691 A.2d at
307. The court ultimately concluded that in light of the overwhelming
evidence of guilt presented independent of the other-crime evidence, the
flawed instruction was not fatal; therefore, the appellate decision affirming Marrero's conviction must be upheld. See id. at 497, 691 A.2d at
307.
Justice O'Hern authored a concurring opinion that agreed that the
conviction should be affirmed, but for reasons different from those espoused by the majority. See id. (O'Hern, J., concurring). Justice
O'Hern parted from the majority's statement that the appellate court's error could be saved by harmless-error analysis. See id. According to
Justice O'Hern, admitting evidence that should have been excluded is
harmful in and of itself. See id. at 497-98, 691 A.2d at 307 (O'Hern, J.,
concurring). Justice O'Hern reasoned that the appellate court's decision
should stand, however, because under the New Jersey rules for interlocutory relief, the appellate division's determination that the other-crime
evidence was admissible was entitled to the same deference accorded a
trial court. See id. at 498, 691 A.2d at 307-08 (O'Hern, J., concurring).
The proper question on appeal, the justice suggested, was "whether the
intermediate level court should have deferred to the trial court, not
whether the discretionary rulings under which the trial court took place
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would not constitute an abuse of the discretion to admit evidence." Id. at
499, 691 A.2d at 308 (O'Hern, J., concurring). Justice O'Hern commented that the appellate court simply reached a different conclusion than
the trial court after balancing the probative value against the prejudicial
effects. See id. The justice then posited that the appellate court's decision should be given deference because the appellate court set the ground
rules for the trial by ordering the admittance of the other-crime evidence.
See id.
In response to the majority's opinion, Justice Handler wrote a
scathing dissent that sharply criticized the majority's harmless-error
analysis. See id. (Handler, J., dissenting). Justice Handler declared the
majority's analysis "seriously flawed" and accused the majority of
reaching a "predetermined outcome." See id. at 500, 691 A.2d at 308
(Handler, J., dissenting). After reiterating the Cofield four-prong test,
Justice Handler asserted that the majority's inquiry improperly focused
on the first prong. See id., 691 A.2d at 308-09 (Handler, J., dissenting).
Justice Handler conceded that the other-crime evidence was relevant and
material, but argued that because reasonable minds differed as to the admissibility of the other-crime evidence, the trial court's unwavering determination that the other-crime evidence was "overwhelmingly prejudicial" should take precedence. See id. at 501-02, 691 A.2d at 309-10
(Handler, J., dissenting). Justice Handler then accused the majority of
"feign[ing] indifference to the internal inconsistencies [of] its own analysis." Id. at 503, 691 A.2d at 310 (Handler, J., dissenting). The justice
stated that it was logically inconsistent for the majority to concede that
the appellate division committed an error in ordering the inclusion of the
other crime evidence, but to rely on that error as support for the majority's decision. See id. The dissenting justice also argued that the majority's approach gave an inordinate amount of weight to the first part of the
Cofield test and neglected the balancing mandated by the fourth prong.
See id. Justice Handler asserted that the cases cited by the majority are
distinguishable from the Marrero case because they did not stand for
whether logically relevant evidence, the prejudicial effect of which outweighs the probative value, were admissible; rather, the cases solely addressed the issue of relevance. See id. at 503-04, 691 A.2d at 310
(Handler, J., dissenting).
Justice Handler then proposed the analysis he deemed appropriate.
See id. at 504, 691 A.2d at 310-11 (Handler, J., dissenting). According
to the dissenting justice, the analysis should have begun with the trial
court's findings. See id. These findings should have been given great
deference and weight, Justice Handler argued, because it is the trial court
that is generally most familiar with the "progress of the trial, the nature
and quality of the prosecution's evidence, the feel of the courtroom, and
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sense of the jury's impression of the defendant." Id. at 504-05, 691
A.2d at 311 (Handler, J., dissenting).
A proper harmless-error analysis, Justice Handler posited, cannot
consider overwhelming evidence of guilt, but should look to overwhelming evidence of the defendant's intent to commit murder. See id. at 505,
691 A.2d at 311 (Handler, J., dissenting). The inquiry must focus on
intent, Justice Handler stated, because that was the issue for which the
other-crime evidence was proffered. See id. After conducting this analysis, the dissenting justice concluded that the admission of the other-crime
evidence for the prosecution to use in buttressing its motive theory argument was not a harmless error, because the jury could have chosen to
find Marrero guilty of manslaughter instead of purposeful murder. See
id. at 505-06, 691 A.2d at 311-12 (Handler, J., dissenting). Indeed, Justice Handler surmised that the "record inescapably raise[d] the real possibility that the erroneous admission of the other-crimes evidence 'led the
jury to reach a result that it otherwise might not have reached."' Id. at
506, 691 A.2d at 312 (quoting State v. Bankston, 63 N.J. 263, 273, 307
A.2d 65, 70 (1973)) (Handler, J., dissenting).
Justice Handler then criticized the jury instruction as doing little to
convey the essence of an ideal instruction: that the jury could only use
the other-crime-evidence for the homicide charge. See id. at 509-10, 691
A.2d at 313 (Handler, J., dissenting). Justice Handler chastised the majority's interpretation of prior case law as creating a "legal limbo" concerning jury instruction sufficiency. See id. at 510, 691 A.2d at 314
(Handler, J., dissenting). Prior cases cited to by the majority emphatically established a clear and express threshold, Justice Handler asserted,
and it was "sophistic and disingenuous for [the majority] to fob off the
absence of clear and express statements in these instructions. . .

."

Id.

The dissenting judge then condemned the court for obfuscating the firm
lesson established by prior decisions that addressed the adequacy of limiting instructions. See id.
The dissent reemphasized that the only issue to be decided by the
supreme court was whether the conceded errors, both at the trial and appellate levels, could have led the jury towards "a result it otherwise
might not have reached." Id. at 511, 691 A.2d at 314 (Handler, J., dissenting). Such a result was achieved, Justice Handler concluded, because
the jury could have conceivably delivered a verdict of aggravated manslaughter. See id. Justice Handler then claimed that the majority answered the wrong question in its decision. See id. The dissent posited
that rather than deciding the error was harmless because it would not
have been an error of the trial court to admit the evidence, the majority's
inquiry should have focused on the fact that the trial court acted within
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its discretion when deciding to exclude the other-crime evidence. See id.
Justice Handler finally concluded that the errors that occurred at both the
trial and appellate court levels unquestionably denied defendant his right
to a fair trial. See id.
By holding that convictions supported by ample overwhelming evidence of guilt should be affirmed despite a harmless error during a defendant's trial, the Supreme Court of New Jersey achieved the correct result in this fact-sensitive situation. Although the appellate court did
override its jurisdiction by imposing its own balancing outcome upon the
trial court, defendant should not unduly benefit from this error.
Because the other-crime evidence was intertwined with facts relating
to intent and motive, it must be held harmless error to admit the othercrime evidence, despite the trial court's reluctance to do so. Intent and
motive go to the very heart of the prosecution's case. Indeed, evidence
that goes to motive should be admissible even if it might sway the jury
against the defendant. A defendant is entitled to a fair and just trial, not
a trial where only evidence that is not possibly inflammatory is admitted.
Here, the prosecution did not unlawfully use the evidence for proving or
even intimating propensity. Rather, the prosecution limited the othercrime evidence to proving the basic elements of its case. The appellate
court clearly should not have imposed its interpretation of the probative
value-prejudicial effect balancing test on the trial court. However, the
appropriate remedy is not overturning a conviction bestowed by a jury
after careful deliberation and consideration of all the evidence, especially
when the other-crime evidence was only a small part of the entire picture.
Therefore, the supreme court correctly upheld defendant's conviction.
Pamela M. Madas

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE- SEARCH AND SEIZURE- A POLICE OFFICER
WHO OBSERVES WHAT APPEARS TO BE AN ILLEGAL DRUG
TRANSACTION TRANSPIRE IN AN AUTOMOBILE IS PERMITTED TO
INDEPENDENTLY CONDUCT A REASONABLE INVESTIGATORY STOP
OF THE CAR REGARDLESS OF WHETHER ITEMS SEIZED FROM A
SEPARATE PERSON, WHO WAS NO LONGER IN THE AUTOMOBILE,
WERE POSSIBLY SEIZED ILLEGALLY-State v. Arthur, 149 N.J. 1,

691 A.2d 808 (1997).
On June 26, 1993, Detective Harem Smallwood and other officers
were engaged in an undercover surveillance operation of an area notorious for drug trafficking. See State v. Arthur, 149 N.J. 1, 4, 691 A.2d
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808, 809 (1997). During the middle afternoon on that clear and sunny
day, Smallwood observed, using binoculars from approximately 150 feet
away, an automobile drive into the surveillance area and park. When the
car stopped, defendant Christopher Arthur was the only occupant in the
vehicle. Almost immediately thereafter, Smallwood witnessed a woman,
later identified as Deborah Walls, enter the car from the passenger's side
of Arthur's vehicle.
Detective Smallwood observed Arthur and Walls communicate with
one another in the automobile for about five minutes. Upon exiting the
vehicle, Smallwood noticed that Walls exhibited suspicious behavior and
was now carrying a brown bag paper under her arm, which she did not
possess prior to entering the car. Walls then proceeded to walk away
while Arthur left the area in his car.
Smallwood, an experienced narcotics detective, assessed the location
of this occurrence, the pair's mannerisms and behavior, and the newly
acquired paper bag, and determined that he just observed a drug transaction. See id. at 5, 691 A.2d at 809. Based on this conclusion, Smallwood broadcasted a description of Arthur's vehicle, and then instructed
two uniformed policeman patrolling the vicinity to detain Walls. Walls
was quickly stopped and a search of the brown bag uncovered approximately 100 to 200 glass vials containing traces of a white residue.
Smallwood testified at trial that these vials, known on the streets as
"used vials," are originally packaged as cocaine and, after being used,
are routinely recycled for money. See id., 691 A.2d at 810.
Upon learning that Walls was found in possession of used vials,
Smallwood radioed a second transmission that described Arthur's car.
This time, however, he also included the license plate number and orders
to stop the car because it possibly contained drug paraphernalia. Two
detectives in a marked police car, Williams and Hawkins, heard the
broadcast and eventually spotted Arthur's car traveling on the road. The
detectives successfully stopped Arthur and ordered him to get out of the
vehicle. Upon exiting, Arthur proclaimed that he had "bottles" in the
back pocket of his pants, which Williams understood to mean glass vials.
Williams discovered three such vials in Arthur's pocket, and then arrested him. See id. at 6, 691 A.2d at 810.
Arthur was indicted for third-degree cocaine possession in violation
of New Jersey law. See id. Arthur later made a motion to suppress the
cocaine, alleging that the detectives did not have the legal right to stop
his car. See id. The trial court denied his motion, holding that in light
of Smallwood's observations, the officers maintained a "clear articulable
suspicion" adequate to stop Arthur and Walls. See id. Further, the trial
court determined that once Arthur notified the police that he possessed
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the vials, they developed probable cause to search him, even if the search
and seizure of Walls was improper. See id. Arthur then pleaded guilty
to the offense but reserved his right to appeal the suppression motion.
See id. The trial court sentenced Arthur to a three year probationary period, and five hours per month of community service for one year. See
id. In addition, the court suspended Arthur's driver's license for six
months, and imposed a $1,000 fine, and minimal other fees. See id.
The appellate division reversed the trial court's denial of the suppression motion and remanded the case. See id. at 7, 691 A.2d at 810.
Noting that the interaction between Arthur and Walls was relevant, the
court determined that the totality of the circumstances did not satisfy the
threshold standard of reasonable suspicion. See id. The court determined that Smallwood was merely acting on a hunch because the events
transpired in the middle of the afternoon and he did not actually see any
drugs or money change hands. See id. Therefore, the appellate division
concluded that because the police did not have a reasonable suspicion to
detain Walls, the evidence seized from her could not be used to support a
reasonable suspicion to stop Arthur. See id., 691 A.2d at 811.
The New Jersey Supreme Court granted certification, and in a
unanimous opinion reversed the judgment of the appellate division. See
id. at 16, 691 A.2d at 815. The court held that even if the search of
Walls was unlawful, Smallwood's experience and knowledge sufficiently
supported an articulable and reasonable suspicion that Arthur had engaged in criminal activity, which justified an investigatory stop and resulted in his own admission to possessing cocaine. See id. at 15-16, 691
A.2d at 814-15. The court determined that enough evidence existed to
stop Arthur without considering the independent significance of the drug
paraphernalia seized from Walls. See id. at 15, 691 A.2d at 815.
Writing for a unanimous panel, Justice Handler began the court's
analysis by discussing the Fourth Amendment's guard against unreasonable search and seizure, and reviewing the standards applicable to police
conduct during an investigatory stop of a person or automobile. See id.
at 7, 691 A.2d at 811. Referring to Terry v. Ohio, Justice Handler emphasized that police conduct during an investigatory stop should be assessed under the Fourth Amendment by balancing the law officer's need
to initiate a search against an individual's right to privacy. See id.
(quoting 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)). The court noted that police action
should be judged objectively and that reasonable inferences can be considered in light of all the circumstances. See id. at 7-8, 691 A.2d at 811.
The justice stated that an officer's subjective, good-faith beliefs or
hunches do not satisfy the requirements of the Fourth Amendment;
rather, specific and articulable facts must be presented. See id. at 8, 691
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A.2d at 811.
Next, Justice Handler asserted that the New Jersey Supreme Court
specifically adopted the Terry test in State v. Thomas. See id. (citing 110
N.J. 673 (1988)). The court explained that investigatory stops apply to
automobiles and, based on the totality of circumstances, an officer may
detain a car if he or she reasonably believes that the vehicle was involved
in criminal activity. See id. (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S.
411, 421-22 (1981)). Next, Justice Handler reviewed several other circuit and state supreme court decisions, noting that these courts have expanded the scope of review for a car stop. See id. at 9-10, 691 A.2d at
812. Additionally, the justice stated that the Supreme Court has considered the area and location of conduct, an individual's behavior and mannerisms, and an officer's experience with drug transactions to determine
the appropriateness of an automobile stop. See id. at 9, 691 A.2d at 81112.
Analyzing Smallwood's observations, the court determined that his
inferences justified an investigatory stop of Arthur. See id., 691 A.2d at
812. The court considered several details, including: (1) the fact that the
area was known for drug trafficking; 2) the brevity of the interaction
between the parties; and 3) the fact that paper bags are traditionally used
to transport drugs. See id. In addition, Justice Handler stressed Smallwood's expertise in this field and chastised the lower court for disregarding Walls' suspicious demeanor upon exiting the car. See id. at 1011, 691 A.2d at 812. Furthermore, the court underscored that although
Arthur's actions could have been interpreted as innocent behavior,
Smallwood reasonably suspected that Arthur was engaging in criminal
activity. See id. at 11, 691 A.2d at 812-13. Therefore, without considering the fact that drug paraphernalia was seized from Walls, the supreme
court concluded that Smallwood articulated a reasonable basis for ordering Arthur stopped. See id. at 12, 691 A.2d at 813.
Justice Handler next explained that it was crucial to consider the
stop of Arthur separate from that of Walls because the stop of Walls, although not an issue before the court, was apparently illegal. See id. The
court proclaimed that searches ordinarily are limited to allow an officer
to search for weapons, not to accumulate evidence of a crime. See id. at
14, 691 A.2d at 814. Since Smallwood only witnessed what appeared to
be a routine drug transaction, no articulable reasons existed to consider
Walls a dangerous suspect. See id. Therefore, even though the stop of
Walls was reasonable, the search was not. See id. at 15, 691 A.2d at
814. The court did not consider, however, the possible illegal search of
Walls a relevant factor in the decision not to suppress the drugs seized
from Arthur. See id., 691 A.2d at 815. Justice Handler reiterated that
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the stop of an individual and the seizure of items from that individual
must be considered separately. See id.
The final issue that the justice addressed was whether the officers
lawfully searched Arthur after stopping his vehicle. See id. at 16, 691
A.2d at 815. After lawfully stopping Arthur, the justice expounded, the
police were also permitted subsequently to order him to exit the vehicle.
See id. (citing Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 (1977)). The
court stressed that the seizure of the drug vials occurred after Arthur explicitly admitted that he possessed drugs. See id. The court then concluded that the admission, coupled with the recognition that "bottles" are
commonly known in street rhetoric to mean vials of cocaine, gave the officer probable cause to search Arthur. See id. Thus, this whole transaction occurred independent of Walls' stop and seizure, and the New Jersey
Supreme Court summarily dismissed the judgment of the appellate division. See id.
In deciding this case, the New Jersey Supreme Court clarified the
separate standards of review for an stop and for a search. The lower
courts disagreed on whether Smallwood's reasonable suspicion was based
on his observations of Arthur, or on the drug paraphernalia seized from
Walls. The New Jersey Supreme Court's conclusion that Smallwood was
entitled to stop Arthur in light of all the circumstances involving the undercover operation will now afford police greater latitude to detain suspected drug dealers. The decision, however, appears to leave two question unanswered. First, knowing that Arthur was in moving vehicle and
possible evidence could have been destroyed, why did Smallwood refrain
from stopping him until drugs were seized from Walls? Second, why
does the court expand the rationale for stopping persons suspected of
drug trafficking, yet restrict the ability of police to search them for the
same offense.
The real issue in this case was not whether reasonable suspicion existed to stop Arthur, but when was it established. The supreme court felt
that the totality of the interactions between Arthur and Walls justified
Smallwood to stop both. Smallwood, however, chose to detain only
Walls, who was a pedestrian, as opposed to Arthur, who was a motorist.
Smallwood obviously believed that both were equally involved and it appeared more logical either to simultaneously order both individuals
stopped or go after Arthur first because of the inherent mobility of a car.
The court does not explain why Smallwood waited until drugs were
found on Walls to stop Arthur if reasonable suspicion was already established.
The answer appears obvious- Smallwood wanted to insure that evidence of crime did exist. It is unclear whether Smallwood would have
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ordered the vehicle stopped if he was notified that Walls did not possess
any drugs. Considering that he did not initially go after Arthur, the answer is probably not. Therefore, it appears that the police are lucky that
the supreme court froze the point in time that reasonable suspicion may
have existed and did not consider any subsequent police actions. The
court may have actually adopted a subjective, rather than objective, test
because the ordinary police person should have ordered both individuals
stopped immediately upon establishing a reasonable suspicion.
Another somewhat puzzling aspect of the court's decision was the
analysis and rationale relating to the seizure of drug paraphernalia from
Walls. Although this was not an issue for the court to resolve, its dicta
may lead to future problems or confusion. The court presumed that the
search was illegal even though the stop was permissible. The court,
however, also went to great lengths to show that the totality of circumstances clearly inferred that a drug transaction occurred. In addition, the
court recognized typical street rhetoric such as "bottles" and permitted
the officer's experience and knowledge to infer that paper bags are commonly used with transporting drugs. Considering the fact that the court
was so wary of these technical aspects of the drug industry, it is hard to
comprehend that the court did not acknowledge the inherent violence attributed to the sale and distribution of drugs. The court maintained that
the search was illegal because there was no threat of violence to the police. Assuming that reasonable suspicion existed to believe that a drug
transaction occurred, only three items were likely to be concealed in the
paper bag: drugs, money or weapons. Since the court understood the
circumstances to indicate narcotics were involved, it is troubling not to
allow the police to search an item capable of containing a weapon. In
actuality, by allowing the police greater latitude in stopping an individual, but possibly less to search them, the court may have placed officers
in a dangerous position.
Michael Pepper Nachman

INSURANCE LAW-ADDITIONAL

INSUREDS- SHIPPER'S NEGLIGENT
SELECTION OF DEFECTIVE MATERIAL DURING LOADING WAS PART
OF "USE"
OF TRACTOR-TRAILER,
QUALIFYING SHIPPER AS
ADDITIONAL INSURED UNDER OMNIBUS PROVISION OF TRAILER
OWNER'S POLICY-Kennedy v. Jefferson Smurfit Co., 147 N.J. 394,

688 A.2d 89 (1997).
Plaintiff Joseph Kennedy (Kennedy) was injured when a rotted pallet
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collapsed while being loaded onto a tractor-trailer that Kennedy owned.
See Kennedy v. Jefferson Smurfit Co., 147 N.J. 394, 396, 688 A.2d 89,
90 (1997). The vehicle was insured by, and leased to, North Operating
Co. (North), who in turn entered an agreement for shipment of the cargo
with Jefferson Smurfit Co. (Jefferson). Jefferson loaded the trailer with
cardboard, placed on its own pallets, after which Kennedy delivered the
trailer from Jefferson's facility to Ultra Packaging Corp. (Ultra). Following his arrival at the Ultra destination, Kennedy was idly watching
the unloading of the cardboard cargo when a pallet suddenly collapsed,
causing the cardboard to land on Kennedy.
Kennedy brought suit again Jefferson, claiming that the pallet that
collapsed was defective. See id. Jefferson then filed both a third-party
complaint against North and a declaratory judgment claim against North's
motor vehicle insurance carrier, New Jersey Manufacturers Insurance Co.
(NJM). See id. at 397, 688 A.2d at 90. Jefferson claimed that it was
covered under the "use" provision of North's "Trucker's Policy." See
id.
Jefferson acknowledged its own degree of fault, and settled Kennedy's tort claim. See id. Both North and NJM filed for summary
judgment, and Jefferson opposed, filing its own summary judgment
cross-motion. See id. The New Jersey Superior Court, Law Division,
granted Jefferson's motion against NJM for $750,000, but also granted
North's motion, thus prohibiting Jefferson's indemnification claim
against the company. See id.
The New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, affirmed, determining that NJM's policy covered Jefferson for the injury to Kennedy
because there was a causal connection between the injury and the loading
and unloading of North's truck. See id. Furthermore, the appellate court
decided that Jefferson's claim for indemnification against North was rendered moot by its finding that Jefferson was covered under NJM's policy.
See id. Both Jefferson and NJM appealed the court's decision. See id. at
397-98, 688 A.2d at 90-91.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey granted certification. See id. at
398, 688 A.2d at 91. The court affirmed the appellate court's decision,
holding that Jefferson's negligent selection of a defective pallet during
loading was part of the "use" of Kennedy's tractor-trailer, thereby qualifying Jefferson as an "additional insured" under the omnibus provision
of NJM's trucker's policy. See id. at 405, 688 A.2d at 94. In a majority
opinion authored by Justice Garibaldi, the court also ruled that Jefferson's indemnity claim against North was moot because of its decision.

See id.
The majority recognized that no party claimed that the trailer was
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not a "covered auto" under NJM's policy, and that the policy contained
an "omnibus clause" that included any party that used or operated such a
covered auto. See id. at 398, 688 A.2d at 91. Furthermore, the justice
observed the well-settled principle that a vehicle's use includes acts of
loading and unloading. See id. Justice Garibaldi recounted that in determining coverage for injuries sustained in the course of loading and
unloading objects, the injury "'must have occurred during the process of
loading or unloading the vehicle and be causally connected with that
act.'" Id. at 399, 688 A.2d at 91 (quoting Maryland Cas. Ins. Co. v.
New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co., 48 N.J. Super. 314, 320, 137 A.2d 577, 581
(App. Div.), aff'd, 28 N.J. 17, 145 A.2d 15 (1958)). This framework
was expanded, the court enunciated, to include what is known as the
"complete operation" doctrine. See id. This test, the court proclaimed,
required the aggrieved party to show "'that the act or omission which resulted in the injury was necessary to carry out the loading or unloading.'" Id. at 399-400, 688 A.2d at 92 (quoting Employers' Liab. Assurance Corp. v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 228 F. Supp. 896, 899-900 (D. Md.
1964)).
The majority then discussed the dilemma faced by the court, in that
the injury clearly occurred during the unloading process, but the negligent act of selecting the defective pallet occurred before the loading of
the cargo. See id. at 400-01, 688 A.2d at 92. Thus, the court suggested,
the key issue became whether the selection of a defective pallet was part
of the loading and unloading of the trailer, or some unrelated act. See id.
In choosing the former, Justice Garibaldi observed that NJM conceded that the pallets were necessary to the loading of the cardboard,
were chosen for that specific cargo, and were therefore an integral part of
the loading of the cargo. See id. at 401, 688 A.2d at 92.
The justice then addressed NJM's argument that this case was distinct from the loading and unloading cases, and was instead analogous to
cases denying coverage when the negligent injury occurred as a result of
defects located on the premises prior to any loading or unloading. See
id. at 401-02, 688 A.2d at 92-93. The court explained that even under
the reasoning of such cases, Jefferson would be covered by NJM's policy
because courts have found coverage to extend to "negligence in loading
or unloading [a] vehicle, including preliminary and subsequent measures
proximate in time related to its loading or unloading." See id. at 402,
688 A.2d at 93 (quoting Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co. v. Richards, 100 N.J. Super. 180, 185, 241 A.2d 468, 471 (Ch. Div. 1968), aff'd, 105 N.J. Super. 48, 251 A.2d. 134 (App. Div. 1969)).
Justice Garibaldi also rejected NJM's argument that public policy
dictated a finding that Jefferson was not an "additional insured." See id.

1732

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[27:1709

at 403, 688 A.2d at 93. The court elaborated that, contrary to NJM's assertion, "use" coverage must be broadly construed to protect the innocent victims injured in motor vehicle accidents. See id. at 403-04, 688
A.2d at 94. The court further emphasized that broad interpretations of
"use" provisions would not in the future, and have not historically,
lead
to increased premiums for vehicle operators, as NJM alleged. See id. at
404, 688 A.2d at 94.
As a result of its interpretation of the case law concerning insurance
contracts, the majority pronounced that Jefferson's selection of a defective pallet was necessary to the process of loading and unloading North's
trailer, and therefore Jefferson qualified as an "additional insured" under
NJM's insurance policy. See id. at 405, 688 A.2d at 94. The court
noted that as a consequence of its decision, Jefferson's claim against
North for indemnification was rendered moot. See id. Finally, the court
remanded the matter for a determination as to whether Kennedy's settlement with Jefferson was reasonable and in good faith. See id.
Justice O'Hern, joined by Chief Justice Poritz and Justice Pollock,
dissented. See id. at 405, 688 A.2d at 94 (O'Hern, J., dissenting). The
dissent, while agreeing that "use" included loading and unloading of a
vehicle, criticized the majority for focusing on the "use" of the vehicle
rather than the negligent act at issue. See id. at 405-06, 688 A.2d at 9495 (O'Hern, J., dissenting). Justice O'Hern emphasized that whether the
plaintiff was using the truck at the time the injury occurred was irrelevant
to the issue of whether Jefferson was engaged in "loading or unloading"
when it negligently selected the pallets to be used. See id. at 406, 688
A.2d at 95 (O'Hern, J., dissenting).
The justice maintained that this situation was analogous to one in
which a defective hand truck was used in a loading and unloading situation. See id. The dissent suggested that neither the defect in the hand
truck, nor the defect in the pallets, was directly dependent on the loading
or unloading of the vehicle. See id. at 406-07, 688 A.2d at 95 (O'Hern,
J., dissenting). As a result, the dissent opined that a narrower test must
be applied, specifically whether the act of negligence was involved in the
"actual[] loading or unloading" of a vehicle. See id. at 407, 688 A.2d at
95 (O'Hern, J., dissenting).
The negligent act, the dissent claimed, did not occur during the
"use" of the trailer, and therefore was not causally connected to the act
of loading or unloading the cardboard cargo. See id. at 409, 688 A.2d at
96 (O'Hern, J., dissenting). The justices of the dissent, therefore, would
not find Jefferson as an "additional insured" under NJM's policy. See
id.
Kennedy presents a case that strikes at the heart of insurance con-
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tracts and their effect on public policy. On the one hand, an innocent
victim, Joseph Kennedy, was injured because of a negligent act over
which he had no control. As the majority hinted, it is the job of the judiciary and legislature to protect the "Kennedys" of the state. It is simply
common sense that when two parties are involved in an injurious situation, it is the negligent party that must shoulder the blame. It is precisely
this reason that leads companies like NJM to insure businesses, and parties such as North to become insured for its actions.
Unfortunately, the situation in Kennedy does not lend itself to such
easy and clear-cut determinations of liability. NJM, ultimately deemed
"responsible" for the "actions" of its "insured," agreed to contract with
a company, North, which was under no one's definition "negligent."
Instead, Jefferson, concededly negligent in selecting the pallet that caused
the injury, is held to be covered under a policy to which it had not
agreed. It is also common sense that the party with the most information
regarding the risk of a defect in the pallet, and in the best position to
prevent the negligence, was Jefferson, which should have been liable for
its negligence. Jefferson was self-insured against negligence, yet was
allowed, thanks to some broad definitional antics by the majority, to
elude responsibility for an injury that it, and only it, could have prevented. Common sense dictates that Jefferson, and Jefferson alone,
should be liable for these actions.
Mark A. Sblendorio

RIGHT TO COUNSEL- A HOSPITAL RESIDENT Is NOT ENTITLED TO
COUNSEL DURING A RESIDENCY TERMINATION PROCEEDING AND IS

NOT ENTITLED TO HAVE THE PROCEEDING TRANSCRIBEDHernandez v. Overlook Hosp., 149 N.J. 68, 692 A.2d 971 (1997).
Plaintiff, Dr. Allyn Hernandez, was pursuing her medical postgraduate training as a resident at Overlook Hospital (Overlook), a private
non-profit hospital. See Hernandez v. Overlook Hosp., 149 N.J. 68, 70,
692 A.2d 971 (1997). Overlook's residency program, accredited by the
Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education (ACGME), permitted a resident to continue in the program so long as he or she provided "satisfactory" services. See id., 692 A.2d at 972. That determination was left to the discretion of the Program Director and the
Hospital, and the residency contract specifically permitted termination
"for just and sufficient academic cause."
In October 1994, plaintiff was terminated from Overlook's resi-
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dency program for academic reasons. See id. at 71, 692 A.2d at 972.
This termination was premised on a report filed by the Chief Resident,
who was assigned to review plaintiff's work, and the Program Director's
academic judgment. The Chief Resident's report indicated that the services provided by Dr. Hernandez were not satisfactory. Specifically, the
report documented several incidents in which Dr. Hernandez misdiagnosed or improperly treated patients. The report also stated that plaintiff
failed to provide the guidance necessary to teach and supervise her interns. Further, the report stated that Dr. Hernandez lacked the professionalism and medical judgment necessary to perform her duties as a second-year resident.
The Program Director noted that although Dr.
Hernandez had previously received counseling for her academic deficiencies, she still failed to improve. To highlight this assessment, the Program Director explained that in July, 1994, plaintiff entered her assigned
medical service as an intern, rather than as a supervisor.
In response to her termination, plaintiff exercised her right to invoke
the Employee Appeal Procedure. Because the appeals proceeding is not a
legal proceeding, the hospital denied plaintiff's request that her attorney
attend the hearing. See id. at 72, 692 A.2d at 972. In addition, Overlook refused to allow Dr. Hernandez's attorney to review the charts proffered to show plaintiff's incompetence. The hospital explained that
plaintiff's requests were denied in order to protect the confidentiality of
Overlook's patients and to remove any adversarial aspects from the proceeding. After threat of legal action, the hospital agreed to allow plaintiffs attorney to attend the hearing, to present opening and closing statements, and to review all relevant documents except the patient records.
See id. at 72, 692 A.2d at 973. Overlook still refused, however, to permit plaintiffs attorney to present evidence on her behalf or to have the
proceedings transcribed. Dr. Hernandez rejected the hospital's offer.
Unable to achieve an acceptable compromise, plaintiff filed an action seeking injunctive relief. See id. at 73, 692 A.2d at 973. Although
the New Jersey Superior Court, Chancery Division, denied the plaintiff
injunctive relief, the court did rule that Dr. Hernandez was entitled to
counsel at the hearing. See id. The court ordered that the appeals proceeding go forward, with plaintiffs attorney having full participation and
a transcription of the hearing. See id. Specifically, the trial court directed that plaintiff's attorney be allowed to present evidence for plaintiff, explain adverse evidence offered by the Program Director, and present opening and closing arguments. See id. The New Jersey Superior
Court, Appellate Division, affirmed the lower court's decision. See id.
The appeals hearing on plaintiff's termination was held on August 23,
1995, in accordance with the trial court's mandates. See id. The Board
agreed with the Program Director's assessment and finalized plaintiff's
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termination. See id. The Supreme Court of New Jersey granted certification and reversed the appellate division decision. See id. at 82, 692
A.2d at 977.
Justice Garibaldi, writing for the majority, began the court's analysis by agreeing with the hospital's argument that the lower courts' decisions should be reversed because the plaintiff failed to exhaust her internal remedies before seeking judicial intervention. See id. at 73, 692
A.2d at 973. The court further explained that the "exhaustion of remedies" doctrine applied in this case because plaintiff's claim of her right to
counsel did not "'warrant interlocutory judicial interference.'" See id.
(quoting Garrow v. Elizabeth Gen. Hosp. & Dispensary, 79 N.J. 549,
401 A.2d 533 (1979)). The majority then remarked that the court would
address the issues raised in this case, specifically the procedural rights
afforded to medical residents of private hospitals during internal review
of termination decisions. See id. at 74, 692 A.2d at 973.
Distinguishing this case from those concerning procedural protections afforded to fully-licensed physicians, the court noted that for the
purpose of performance review, medical residents are considered students. See id. Justice Garibaldi further explained that based on their
status as students, residents must comply with the residency program's
academic requirements. See id. Therefore, the justice elaborated, the
decision to terminate residents fell within the purview of Overlook's academic freedom. See id. at 76, 692 A.2d at 975. Describing academic
freedom as a constitutional concern, the court explained that the public
interest in supporting higher education required that academic decisions
be shielded from judicial inquiry. See id. at 75-76, 692 A.2d at 974.
Additionally, Justice Garibaldi stated that the public interest in receiving
proficient health care requires that hospitals be permitted to set and implement their own academic standards, without judicial interference. See
id.
Here, Justice Garibaldi observed that plaintiff's dismissal was
premised solely on her failure to meet the residency program's standards.
See id. at 76, 692 A.2d at 975. The court explained that plaintiff's termination resulted from her status as a student and her failure to meet the
applicable academic standards. See id. As such, the justice articulated
that the hospital's decision to terminate plaintiffs residency was
"indistinguishable from any other institutional decision to pass or fail a
student for failure to meet academic requirements." Id. Relying in part
on the analysis provided in Ross v. University of Minnesota, 439 N.W.2d
28 (1989), the court announced that disputes that arise in the academic
environment should be left to the individual academic institution. See id.
at 76-77, 692 A.2d at 975. Justice Garibaldi further acknowledged that
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these decisions are best left to the academics - not the courts. See id. at
77, 692 A.2d at 975.
The court next turned to the cases relied on by the lower courts in
granting plaintiff the right to counsel and the right to have the hearing
transcribed. See id. Noting that procedural due process is not implicated
unless the hospital's behavior rises to the level of state action, Justice
Garibaldi commented that a fundamental fairness inquiry is all that is
constitutionally required. See id. at 78, 692 A.2d at 975-76. Contrary to
the trial court's analysis, the justice stated that the case law only requires
"fair procedures." See id. at 78-79, 692 A.2d at 976. Prior case law,
according to the majority, required only that residents receive adequate
notice of deficiencies and the opportunity to be heard. See id. at 79, 692
A.2d at 976. Full adversarial hearings, the majority noted, are not necessary. See id. Further, the justice explained that cases involving process owed to fully-licensed physicians, which rest on "fundamental fairness," differ from cases involving residents because they do not concern
academic judgments. See id. at 78-79, 692 A.2d at 976.
The court opined that judicial interference in this case would only
impair the Program Director's exercise of academic judgment. See id. at
79, 692 A.2d at 976. Additionally, Justice Garibaldi cautioned that allowing residents to seek judicial intervention would infringe on the Appeal Board's ability to set and enforce policy and performance levels appropriate for participation in Overlook's residency program. See id. The
presence of lawyers and the burden of strict adherence to litigation-like
procedures, the court elaborated, would needlessly hinder academic freedom. See id. Justice Garibaldi noted that allowing judicial intervention
in academic hearings would force doctors to act as judges, rather than
academics. See id. at 79-80, 692 A.2d at 976. The justice further suggested that this would take doctors out of their area of expertise - evaluating medical decisions - and place them in an area where they are admittedly novices - making legal rulings. See id.
The court also expressed concern that judicial intervention in these
types of proceedings would hamper candid evaluation of students because
these documents would be open to judicial scrutiny. See id. at 80, 692
A.2d at 976. The majority surmised that compromising these evaluations
would injure both the integrity of the individual institution in question
and the public's interest in competent health care. See id.
The court noted that the principle of academic freedom is not absolute, and that at times an institution's interest in academic freedom would
be outweighed. See id., 692 A.2d at 977. Justice Garibaldi opined that
an allegation of a civil rights violation, for example, would entitle residents to counsel. See id. Additionally, the court acknowledged that the
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ACGME requires that residency contracts allow residents a right to counsel. See id. at 80-81, 692 A.2d at 977. Justice Garibaldi explained that
Overlook, however, never adopted the ACGME's guidelines and, as
such, allowing residents counsel at termination proceedings is not mandatory. See id. at 81, 692 A.2d at 977.
The court concluded that in light of the plaintiff's status as a student
and the strong public interest in allowing only qualified physicians to
practice medicine, Overlook's decision was defensible from both a substantive and procedural stance. See id. Justice Garibaldi recognized that
residents, nevertheless, do have an interest in attaining a medical license,
ealning an income, and safeguarding their medical reputations. See id.
As such, the court maintained that educational institutions must establish
"fair procedure[s]." See id. Justice Garibaldi defined "fair procedures"
as including adequate notice of a student's deficiencies, a resident's right
to examine the evidence used by the institution to make an academic decision, and a student's right to present his or her case. See id. Applying
these standards to the present case, the court held that plaintiff received
fair process, and thus judicial intervention in her case was inappropriate.
See id. at 82, 692 A.2d at 977.
In dissent, Justice Pollock, joined by Justice Handler and Justice
Stein, criticized the majority's analysis of the fundamentally fair procedure owed to residents in termination proceedings. See id. at 82-83, 692
A.2d at 978 (Pollock, J., dissenting). Specifically, Justice Pollock took
issue with the majority's determination that fair procedure does not require that the plaintiff have a right to counsel at her termination proceedings. See id. at 83, 692 A.2d at 978 (Pollock, J., dissenting). Further, the dissent argued that a lawyer's presence would not unduly burden
academic proceedings. See id. Justice Pollock opined that in denying the
plaintiff both of these safeguards, the majority had "[relied on] exaggerated notions of academic freedom and misplaced fears about the conduct
of lawyers in such proceedings."
Id. at 86, 692 A.2d at 979-80
(Pollock, J., dissenting).
The dissent began by noting that residents are more than mere students. See id. at 83-84, 692 A.2d at 978 (Pollock, J., dissenting). Although Justice Pollock conceded that residency does have academic aspects, the justice argued that in principle, residents are doctors. See id.
at 83, 692 A.2d at 978 (Pollock, J., dissenting). Justice Pollock explained that residents staff the hospital, providing emergency services, a
review of patient charts, and diagnosis and treatment of patients. See id.
The dissent opined that even with the limitations noted by the majority,
Dr. Hernandez appeared to the casual observer to be no different than
attending or fully-licensed physicians. See id. at 83-84, 692 A.2d at 978
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(Pollock, J., dissenting). Further, Justice Pollock argued that Overlook
treated the plaintiff more like a doctor than a student, noting that the hospital agreed to pay Dr. Hernandez for her services, granted her vacation,
and covered her with its liability insurance. See id. at 84, 692 A.2d at
978 (Pollock, J., dissenting).
In addition, Justice Pollock explained that terminating a resident's
training program was substantially similar to revoking a fully licensed
doctor's admitting privileges or denying a licensed physician tenure. See
I., 692 A.2d at 978-79 (Pollock, J., dissenting). The justice noted that
in both of the above instances, principles of fundamental fairness guarantee the doctor's right to counsel. See id., 692 A.2d at 979 (Pollock,
J., dissenting). The dissent further theorized that the majority incorrectly
phrased the issue of this case. See id. The correct inquiry, according to
Justice Pollock, was whether the academic aspects of residency overshadow all other considerations. See id. The dissent suggested that contrary to the majority's assessment in this case, academic issues did not
prevail. See id.
The dissent also criticized the majority's conclusion that an attorney's presence would needlessly burden termination proceedings. See id.
at 85, 692 A.2d at 979 (Pollock, J., dissenting). Justice Pollock commented that this decision is irreconcilable with the facts of this case. See
id. Here, the justice pointed out, plaintiffs counsel attended the hearing
without any adverse consequences. See id. The dissent noted that the
presence of plaintiff's counsel only ensured that the plaintiff believed that
she received fair process. See id.
Pointing to the majority's reservation that residents would still have
a right to counsel in cases involving civil rights issues, Justice Pollock
remarked that the residency termination proceedings should be no different. See id. The justice continued that the court's decision failed to consider the inequality of the hospital's and the resident's position. See id.
at 86, 692 A.2d at 979 (Pollock, J., dissenting). Based on a resident's
admittedly inferior position, Justice Pollock argued that the court should
"level the playing field" by guaranteeing a resident's right to counsel.
See id.
Although there is a strong public interest in securing academic freedom for medical residency programs, the majority decision, by championing academic freedom, ignores the individual resident's interests.
Residents, just like licensed physicians, have an interest in protecting
their professional reputation, securing appropriate training, and retaining
their employment. Allowing an attorney to protect those interests in a
termination proceeding would not hinder academic freedom. Rather, an
attorney's presence in these proceedings would ensure that principles of

1997]

1739

SURVEY

fairness prevail. Barring attorneys from residency termination proceedings allows institutions to take advantage of the inequality in position
between the hospital and residents. In similar situations, courts are
charged with the duty to protect the rights of the minority members.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey, unfortunately, failed to take that into
consideration here.
Colleen F. Walsh

PRETRIAL

PROCEDURE- DISCOVERY- ABSENT
CONDITIONAL
PRIVILEGE DESIGNED TO PROTECT THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF THOSE
INVOLVED, CORPORATE RECORDS CONCERNING EMPLOYER'S INTERNAL
INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGED SEXUAL HARASSMENT ARE RELEVANT AND
GENERALLY DISCOVERABLE-Payton v. New Jersey Turnpike Auth., 148
N.J. 524, 691 A.2d 321 (1997).
Joanne Payton began work as a records clerk for the New Jersey
Turnpike Authority (NJTA) in November 1990. See Payton v. New Jersey Turnpike Auth., 148 N.J. 524, 532, 691 A.2d 321, 324 (1997).
Shortly thereafter, two supervisors allegedly began sexually to harass
her. Payton alleged that on separate occasions, her supervisor, defendant
Robert C. Geberth, touched her without permission and summoned her
into his office, directing her to turn around in order that he could scrutinize her. See id., 691 A.2d at 325. Payton further alleged that on separate occasions defendant Michael Stankowitz, her other supervisor, told
her that he was "horny," said he wanted "to get laid," referenced her
breasts and said "just one time," attempted to peek down her blouse, and
put Payton's hand between his legs during lunch in a public restaurant.
See id. at 533, 691 A.2d at 325. Finally, Payton alleged that during an
office holiday luncheon in December 1993, the two supervisors gave her
a gift, which was presented to her in front of her office colleagues. It
was a "baby doll" nightgown.
In September 1994, Payton filed an in-house complaint with NJTA.
The harassment continued, however, and she filed suit in the law division
of the superior court on March 10, 1995, alleging violations of New Jersey's Law Against Discrimination (LAD). On April 26, 1995, defendant
NJTA reported that it had punished the two supervisors. Specifically,
NJTA alleged that it suspended them without pay, demoted them, and reduced their salaries. Thus, NJTA claimed that the disciplinary action
was an affirmative defense to its alleged vicarious liability for the individual defendants' actions. NJTA sought to show that it neither took part
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in nor permitted the harassment.
At a later date, NJTA represented that on December 8, 1994, it
made findings concerning Payton's in-house complaint and that it had
published an investigative report on March 14, 1995. NJTA also claimed
that on April 13, 1995, its Sexual Harassment Advisory Committee completed a review of that report. Finally, NJTA asserted that on April 25,
1995, its executive commissioners met to discuss the matter and decided
upon the above sanctions. See id. at 533-34, 691 A.2d at 325.
In an effort to assess whether defendant NJTA instituted a prompt
and thorough response to her complaints, Payton executed a broad discovery demand, seeking almost all of NJTA's internal investigation materials. In response, defendant moved for an equally broad protective order.
The law division granted the order in its entirety, thus excluding
from discovery all of NJTA's investigation documents. See id., 691
A.2d at 325. Payton then sought interlocutory review from the appellate
division, which vacated the protective order, and the New Jersey Supreme Court granted NJTA's subsequent motion for leave to appeal. See
id., 691 A.2d at 326.
Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Handler commenced the
analysis by observing that discovery rules are construed liberally and favor broad pretrial disclosure. See id. at 535, 691 A.2d at 326. Justice
Handler further stated that, as a threshold matter, the court needed to
determine whether the materials sought to be discovered were relevant.
See id. While looking to Lehmann v. Toys 'R' Us, 132 N.J. 587 (1993),
for guidance, the court noted that an employer's failure to take adequate
remedial action .inresponse to sexual harassment is cause for direct liability. See id. Thus, the court determined that the sufficiency of an
employer's remedial action is relevant to an employee's allegations. See
id. Likewise, Justice Handler determined that such internal investigative
steps also bear upon an employer's affirmative defense that its remedial
action should absolve it from liability. See id. at 536-37, 691 A.2d at
327. Therefore, the court held that, absent a specific basis for privilege
or confidentiality, "the efficacy of an employer's remedial program is
highly relevant to both an employee's claim against the employer and the
employer's defense to liability." Id. at 537, 691 A.2d at 327.
The justice declined defendant's invitation to limit the measurement
of an effective remedial program simply to the final outcome. See id. In
such a case, the court observed, the internal documents sought by plaintiff would not be discoverable because the efficacy of the investigation
process would be irrelevant to its final outcome. See id. Instead, Justice
Handler. declared that measuring effective remedial action involves ex-
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amining "the process by which the employer arrives at the sanctions that
it imposes on the alleged harasser." See id. The court asserted that neither a court nor a jury can assess the effectiveness of an investigation
without considering the remedial process as a whole. See id.
Continuing, Justice Handler determined that full discovery would
allow Payton to support and advance her assertions that NJTA's failure
promptly to investigate and discipline its employees reflected an unwillingness to remediate the alleged sexual harassment at issue. See id.
Therefore, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the investigatory
process is an important component in evaluating whether an employer has
made a good faith effort to counteract and defeat sexual harassment. See
id., 691 A.2d at 328. Based upon that determination, the court concluded that materials concerning an employer's in-house investigation
into alleged sexual harassment are relevant and generally discoverable in
a case arising under the LAD. See id. at 539, 691 A.2d at 328.
Relevance creates a presumption favoring discovery, but the court
explained that this postulate can be overcome by demonstrating the applicability of an evidentiary privilege. See id. (citing N.J. Ct. R. 4:102(a)). Privileges, Justice Handler further explained, reflect judgments by
society that requirements of confidentiality transcend the need for disclosure. See id. The court then scrutinized the strength of various rationales advanced by NJTA favoring the exclusion of the relevant investigation materials. See id.
First, Justice Handler assessed whether New Jersey recognized a
public policy of confidentiality. See id. at 540, 691 A.2d at 328. The
court claimed that NJTA sought a privilege that would have precluded
discovering confidential materials concerning in-house sexual harassment
investigations. See id., 691 A.2d at 328-29. Initially, the New Jersey
court reaffirmed its belief that confidentiality is an important ingredient
in any effort to maximize the reporting of sexual harassment. See id. at
541, 691 A.2d at 329. Justice Handler determined, however, that it does
not necessarily follow that a privilege is required in order appropriately
to recognize that concern. See id.
After discussing why the case at bar was unlike those cases in which
the court had previously recognized privileges, Justice Handler noted that
both parties to the disclosure/nondisclosure debate pledge allegiance to
the same end: an end to sexual harassment. See id. at 541-42, 691 A.2d
at 329. The justices sided with disclosure and concluded that the court
would not create a blanket privilege. See id., 691 A.2d at 329-30. Instead, the court recognized a conditional privilege that normally will
protect adequately employers' confidentiality concerns. See id. In delineating the bounds of this conditional privilege, the court stated that
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trial courts should attempt to employ redaction, gag orders, or sealed records in an attempt to avoid total suppression of specific documents.
The court next addressed NJTA's second argument in favor of a
privilege, namely, the privilege of self-critical analysis. See id. at 544,
691 A.2d at 330. This privilege, the court explained, exempts from disclosure evaluative sections of an organization's confidential materials.
See id., 691 A.2d at 331. Citing another court's reasoning, Justice Handler observed that this privilege fosters candid and frank internal investigations. See id. (citing Korostynski v. State Div. of Gaming Enforcement, 266 N.J. Super. 549, 630 A.2d 342 (App. Div. 1993)). The New
Jersey Supreme Court refused to adopt either a qualified or an absolute
privilege of self-critical analysis, opining that the confidentiality concerns
justifying such privileges are adequately addressed by existing balancing
tests. See id. at 545, 691 A.2d at 331. In bolstering this conclusion, the
court stated that self-critical analysis is no different from other intimate
information and therefore does not need protection in the form of a broad
privilege. See id. at 546, 691 A.2d at 331. In addition, the court noted
that those privileges that the state legislature has recognized are all firmly
rooted in jurisprudential tradition and indicative of society's commitment
to safeguarding certain confidences, even though such decisions forego
truth. See id.
Justice Handler also cautioned that the court was not convinced that
confidentiality was a necessary prerequisite to frank, productive selfevaluation. See id. at 546-47, 691 A.2d at 332. Instead, the court observed that if an employer's efforts to combat discrimination will be subjected to the scrutiny of civil litigation, the employer may be encouraged
to engage in swift, comprehensive fact finding. See id. at 547, 691 A.2d
at 332. Thus, the court concluded that in New Jersey, a per se privilege
must yield instead to case-by-case balancing, evaluating the alleged victim's right to information against the public's interest in confidentiality.
See id. at 547-48, 691 A.2d at 332. In performing this balancing test,
Justice Handler stressed that in all but the most extreme cases, disclosure
will generally outweigh confidentiality concerns because the elimination
of discrimination is much more important than most private interests.
See id. at 548, 691 A.2d at 333.
While disclosure is the rule and suppression the exception, the court
instructed trial courts to minimize intrusions into an employer's confidential documents by limiting disclosure to those directly involved in the
litigation. See id. at 549, 691 A.2d at 333. To that end, Justice Handler
sanctioned the use of narrowly drawn protective orders in cases requiring
disclosure of an employer's sensitive internal documents. See id.
The court then addressed NJTA's argument that the attorney-client
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privilege shrouds the entire internal evaluation because defendant's attorneys handled portions of the investigation. See id., 691 A.2d at 334.
Justice Handler disagreed with such a blanket assertion, stating that remand was necessary in order for the trial court more fully to apply to this
case the principles underlying the attorney-client privilege. See id. On
remand, the court elaborated, the trial court must assess the exact role
played by NJTA's attorneys relative to each document for which the attorney-client privilege is asserted. See id. at 550, 691 A.2d at 334.
Justice Handler provided some guideposts for use by the trial court.
See id. The court reminded that "a fine line exists between an attorney
who provides legal services or advice . . . and one who performs essentially nonlegal duties." Id. The latter is not a lawyer for the purposes of
the attorney-client privilege, the court maintained, and the privilege is inapplicable to attorneys who lead an investigation for purposes other than
preparation for litigation. See id. at 550-51, 691 A.2d at 334. To hold
otherwise, the court asserted, would encourage employers to use attorneys to conduct internal investigations because any findings would thus
become shrouded in privilege. See id. at 551, 691 A.2d at 334. While
remand was necessary for full determination of the issues in Payton, Justice Handler asserted that there may be no merit to NJTA's attorneyclient privilege argument. See id. Applying the facts to the law, the
court observed that NJTA's investigation began months before Payton
ever filed suit. See id. Thus, the court suggested that NJTA may have
been investigating in order to fulfill its preexisting legal duties rather
than preparing for litigation. See id. Even if the privilege were applicable, the court argued, "[it 'may be pierced upon a showing of need,
relevance and materiality,'" a principle especially appropriate in this case
in which NJTA's claim to the privilege was "tenuous at best." Id. at
552, 691 A.2d at 335.
Recognizing that certain documents may satisfy the standard for
protection by the attorney-client privilege, Justice Handler stated that the
trial court must determine whether NJTA waived its privilege by employing its internal inquiry as an affirmative defense. See id. at 552-53,
691 A.2d at 335. A privilege may not be used as a sword rather than a
shield, and the court declared that "[a] party may not abuse a privilege .
. . by asserting a claim or defense and then refusing to provide the information underlying that claim or defense based on the privilege." Id.
at 553, 691 A.2d at 335. Addressing NJTA's assertion that the affirmative defense in this case only related to the final outcome of the investigation, the court reaffirmed that the efficacy of NJTA's entire investigation was relevant to plaintiff's effort to overcome NJTA's affirmative
defense. See id. at 554, 691 A.2d at 336.
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Next, Justice Handler surveyed NJTA's argument that the workproduct doctrine protected from disclosure its internal investigative
documents. See id. The court explained that the doctrine applies, generally, when (1) the materials were "prepared in anticipation of litigation,"
(2) there is no substantial need for the documents, and (3) the protection
of the doctrine has not been waived. See id. Justice Handler opined that
the doctrine probably does not apply, noting again that NJTA's investigation allegedly was initiated months before Payton filed suit. See id. at
554-55, 691 A.2d at 336. Furthermore, the court buttressed that opinion
by observing that Payton needs to know precisely what NJTA knew and
exactly when it knew it. See id. at 555, 691 A.2d at 336. Finally, as
discussed earlier, Justice Handler mentioned that NJTA may have waived
the protection of the work-product doctrine. See id. In any event, the
court directed the trial court to conduct an in camera review of the materials, determine whether any are protected by the work-product doctrine,
and evaluate whether any possible protection is overcome by (1) Payton's
substantial need or (2) NJTA's waiver of such protection. See id.
Justice Handler also considered the impact of the New Jersey Open
Public Meetings Act ("the Act"), N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:4-6 to -21, upon
this case. See id. The court acknowledged that the Act creates a solid
presumption of access to meetings of public bodies, such as the NJTA,
but recognized that several exceptions might apply. See id. at 555-56,
691 A.2d at 336-37. In light of the legislature's intent to foster public
participation in government affairs, the court maintained that few cases
will allow for even partial disclosure. See id. at 557, 691 A.2d at 337.
First, the court dispensed with NJTA's claim that its personnel matters
were worthy of nondisclosure. See id. Justice Handler observed that any
confidentiality concerns were moot because of NJTA's public announcement that the individual defendants had been sanctioned. See id. at 55758, 691 A.2d at 338. Second, the court noted that NJTA was definitionally precluded from relying on the "invasion of privacy" exception to the
Act. See id. at 558, 691 A.2d at 338. Third, Justice Handler rejected
NJTA's reliance on the exception relating to pending litigation and the
attorney-client privilege; such protections were duplicative of protections
otherwise offered by the work-product doctrine and attorney-client privilege. See id. As previously mentioned, Justice Handler concluded that
the trial court must redact and withhold documents only in a limited
number of circumstances. See id.
In conclusion, the New Jersey Supreme Court emphasized that the
court normally defers to trial court determinations concerning discovery
matters and protective orders. See id. at 559, 691 A.2d at 338. The
court insisted, however, that such deference is improper if the trial
court's discovery conclusion or protective order is premised upon an er-
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roneous understanding of the relevant law. See id. On remand, Justice
Handler advised, the trial court should remember that "'It]he need for
secrecy should extend no further than necessary to protect the
[demonstrated need for] confidentiality.'" See id. (citing Hammock v.
Hoffinan-LaRoche, 142 N.J. 356, 381-82, 662 A.2d 546, 559 (1995)).
The supreme court also reminded the trial court to begin with the presumption that the materials requested by plaintiff are discoverable. See
id. at 559-60, 691 A.2d at 339. After beginning with these broad propositions, the New Jersey Supreme Court directed the trial court to afford
NJTA the chance to assert specific claims of privilege or confidentiality.
See id. at 560, 691 A.2d at 339. The court thus affirmed the appellate
division judgment and remanded to the law division in order for that
court to apply the principles set forth herein. See id.
Payton is the logical extension of Lehmann, and consistent with the
latter, Payton implicitly directs employers to conduct swift and effective
investigations. Some may argue that Payton will cause an employer simply to do nothing in an effort not to create any discoverable documents.
That argument fails, however, because Lehmann subjects the employer to
liability for such inaction. Thus, in an evidentiary sense, if one accepts
Lehmann, Payton must follow. Without the employer's documents, there
is no way to assess the investigation. Furthermore, that argument misses
the point because Payton only applies if the employer raises its investigation as an affirmative defense.
From a policy perspective, Payton again makes sense because now
all parties will know exactly what the employer knew and when it knew
it. The logical result is that an employer will be further motivated to
conduct an effective investigation, knowing that later its actions might
possibly be subject to judicial scrutiny. In such a case, the employer
should welcome the opportunity to show the world that its investigation
was thorough, efficient, and fair. Therefore, the only employer who
would object to Payton is one who inadequately or inefficiently investigates allegations of harassment.
Kevin J. Walsh

